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131 
THE CONTINUING VITALITY OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS’S 
FREE EXPRESSION JURISPRUDENCE 
Frederick M. Lawrence* 
There is a remarkable freshness to the work of Louis D. 
Brandeis.  Whereas the writings of many of his contemporaries can 
seem dated to the reader of today, Brandeis continues to speak to us 
in a way that is rare in its relevance and continued vitality.1  As with 
any historical figure, Brandeis must be seen in his own historical 
context (a task this conference on Louis D. Brandeis: An 
Interdisciplinary Retrospective has performed exceptionally), and 
thus his work is historically contingent in part.  Nevertheless, 
Brandeis’s writings and the impact of his career also transcend time 
in a way that few others can rival.  
There are at least three main themes that have run through the 
papers and presentations of this conference, 2  illustrating the 
continuing vitality of Brandeis as a lawyer and as a justice.  
Theory and practice – Brandeis understood that at the highest 
level, theory and practice do not pull in opposite directions but are 
mutually reinforcing.3  As a practitioner, Brandeis was justly 
celebrated for introducing what can best be understood as an 
academic approach of reliance on sociological evidence in the 
 
*Secretary and Chief Executive Office, Phi Beta Kappa Society; Visiting Professor of Law 
and Senior Research Scholar, Yale Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center.  This paper is based on the presentation delivered at the conference 
on Louis D. Brandeis: An Interdisciplinary Retrospective, on April 1, 2016, at the Touro 
College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. My thanks to Yishai Schwartz, Yale Law School 
class of 2018, for his editorial and research assistance. © 2017.  
1 See Saby Ghoshray, Looking Through the Prism of Privacy and Trespass: Smartphones 
and the Fourth Amendment, 16 U. D.C. L. REV. 73, 82 (2012); Kathryn McEnery, The 
Usefulness of Non-Linear Thinking: Conceptual Analysis Tools and an Opportunity to 
Develop Electronic Health Information Privacy Law, 23 HEALTH LAWYER 18, 21 (2010). 
2 Brandeis and Free Speech, Louis D. Brandeis: An Interdisciplinary Retrospective, 
Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Central Islip, N.Y. (Apr. 1, 2016). 
3 See Melvin I. Urofsky, “A Good Name Is Rather to Be Chosen Than Great Riches”: The 
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 11, 13 
(1998). 
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celebrated “Brandeis Brief” in Muller v. Oregon.4  As a Supreme 
Court Justice, his most recognized and longest-lasting achievements 
include not only cases exploring the constitution and the nature of 
civil liberties, but such intricate and practice-oriented questions as the 
application of federal or state law in state law claims brought in 
federal court under federal diversity jurisdiction in Erie Railroad v. 
Tompkins.5  These are but two among many possible examples.  To 
Brandeis, the practitioner was most effective when his work was 
grounded in deep theories of legal systems and justice, and the judge 
was most profound when his work resonated with real world contexts 
and issues.6  
Doing well and doing good – Before coming to the Court, 
Brandeis was an extraordinarily accomplished attorney in the private 
practice of law.7  Although he did not seek to use his legal skills to 
amass immense wealth, his practice was highly successful in 
financial terms.8  Yet it was Brandeis, the “people’s lawyer,” who 
essentially invented two aspects of practice that we now largely take 
for granted as being basic to an attorney’s ethnical obligations.9  First, 
Brandeis believed that attorneys were required in certain instances to 
take into account the interest of parties beyond their particular 
clients.10  In his confirmation hearings before the United States 
Senate, in the spring of 1916, he famously stated that he was the 
“lawyer for the situation.”11  Second, Brandeis provided 
representation gratis for those who could not afford his legal 
services, and for cases that he thought raised significant public issues, 
anticipating and championing what would become a well-accepted 
 
4 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk 
Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 104-05 (1993). 
5 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, 
at ix (1984). 
6 See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law, in BUSINESS-A 
PROFESSION 329 (1933); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for 
Intermediate Premises, 80 HARV. L. REV. 986, 988-89 (1967). 
7 Melvin I. Urofsky, The Legacy of Louis D. Brandeis, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 189, 
191 (2012). 
8 Id. 
9 See Don Burnett, An Aim High and A Vision Broad: The Public Responsibilities of A 
Public Profession, 45 ADVOCATE 12, 12 (2002); Geoffrey Hazard, Lawyer for the Situation, 
39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377, 379 (2004).  
10 See Hazard, supra note 9, at 379. 
11 Hazard, supra note 9, at 377; Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering 
Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1502-03 (1996). 
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obligation for an attorney to dedicate some proportion of her or his 
time to pro bono work.12 
Moral courage – There are many ways to illustrate the moral 
courage that Brandeis exemplified.13  In his famous concurring 
opinion in Whitney v. California,14 Brandeis wrote “those who won 
our independence believed . . . liberty to be the secret of happiness, 
and courage to be the secret of liberty.”15  Perhaps there is no better 
example than his willingness to play a leadership role in the 
American Zionist movement.16  Brandeis, although always 
identifying as a Jew, did not take on any significant roles in the 
American Jewish community through the early part of his career.17  
But by the early years of World War I, he had become one of the 
leading spokesmen in America for the cause of Jewish nationalism in 
then-Palestine.18  One suspects that Brandeis had to know that there 
was some possibility that his close identification with Zionism at the 
time could negatively affect his ambitions for prominent 
appointments, especially for a seat on the Supreme Court; with 
Woodrow Wilson, who greatly trusted and valued Brandeis as an 
advisor and counselor, as President, such ambitions were well within 
reach.19  Nonetheless, Brandeis, moved by the plight of fellow Jews, 
took on a significant role as a prominent Zionist.20 
In this final session of the conference, I will address another 
area where Brandeis’s thought retains a great vitality and continues to 
influence our thinking.  I refer to his free expression jurisprudence.  I 
would like to suggest here that Brandeis is significant not only for 
being expansive and even passionate in his views of free expression 
but also for a significantly different philosophical methodology than 
that adopted even by those who shared his conclusions.  The 
Brandeisian approach to free expression provides a firm grounding 
 
12 Spillenger, supra note 11, at 1448. 
13 See generally Urofsky, supra note 7; Spillenger, supra note 11; see also MAX LERNER, 
The Social Thought of Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 9, 9 (Felix Frankfurter ed., 
1932).  
14 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
15 Id. at 375. 
16 See JEFFREY ROSEN, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: AMERICAN PROPHET 146-74 (2016); MELVIN 
UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 399-429 (2009). 
17 Rosen, supra note 16, at 146-47. 
18 See NELSON L. DAWSON, BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 66-70 (University Press of Kentucky, 
ed., 1989). 
19 See id. 
20 Id. 
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for the doctrine, and a grounding that is particularly relevant to our 
time. 
Brandeis is properly thought of as an essential early, if not 
founding, figure, in modern free expression jurisprudence.21  
Brandeis is often associated with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
in this regard; they were the two great dissenters in a series of 
opinions in which the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on free 
speech.22  In United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democrat 
Publishing Co. v. Burleson,23 in which both Brandeis and Holmes 
dissented, Holmes wrote that “I have had the advantage of reading 
the judgment of my brother Brandeis in this case and I agree in 
substance with his view.”24 
Brandeis and Holmes, however, approached the issue of free 
expression from different perspectives.25  The difference is best 
illustrated by reference to the first sedition case in which the two 
justices did not vote together, Gilbert v. State of Minnesota26 in 
1920.27    
Joseph Gilbert was convicted of violating a Minnesota statute 
that proscribed interference with or “discouragement” of the 
“enlistment of men in the military or naval forces of the United States 
or of the State of Minnesota.”28  The statute explicitly made it 
unlawful “to teach or advocate by any written or printed matter 
whatsoever, or by oral speech, that the citizens of this state should not 
aid or assist the United States” in its war effort.29  Gilbert’s 
indictment stemmed from a speech he gave in 1917 that was highly 
critical of American involvement in the World War.30  The Supreme 
Court affirmed Gilbert’s conviction and upheld the constitutionality 
 
21 See UROFSKY, supra note 16, at 553-56, 634-37. 
22 See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., 
dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., 
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting; 
Brandeis, J., concurring in the dissent). 
23 255 U.S. 407 (1921). 
24 Id. at 436 (Holmes, J., dissenting).   
25 See Robert Cover, The Left, the Right and the First Amendment: 1918-1928, 40 MD. L. 
REV. 349, 374-80 (1981). 
26 254 U.S. 325 (1920). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 326. 
29 Id. at 326-27. 
30 Id. 
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of the statute.31  The Court applied the approach developed in a series 
of three 1919 cases, most notably Schenck v. United States.32  In each 
case, the Court applied a test of whether the expression at issue 
represented a “clear and present danger,” finding in the affirmative 
and determining that restriction of expression was thus 
constitutionally permissible.33  In Gilbert, the Court assumed without 
deciding that the Schenck approach, an approach developed in the 
context of federal law and the First Amendment, applied to issues of 
state law.34  The majority of the Court, citing Schenck,35 Frohwerk,36 
Debs37 and Abrams,38 held that the opposition to the war effort in 
Gilbert “was not an advocacy of policies or a censure of actions that 
a citizen had the right to make.”39  Brandeis alone dissented on free 
expression grounds.40 
Brandeis first confronted the threshold question of the source 
of any constitutional protections that Gilbert might enjoy.41  The First 
Amendment on its face – “Congress shall make no law.  . .”42 -- could 
not reach state action.43  The majority of the Court was prepared to 
assume what would ultimately develop into the doctrine of “selective 
incorporation,” whereby certain provisions of the Bill of Rights 
would be applied to the state through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.44  Brandeis was reluctant to seize on the 
Fourteenth Amendment for his constitutional source.45  Instead, he 
 
31 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 331-33. 
32  249 U.S. 47 (1919); see also Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
33 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206-07; Debs, 249 U.S. at 212-13. 
34 See Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 333; see also Gitlow v. United States, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) 
(holding five years later that free expression was protected from State interference through 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
35 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
36 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206. 
37 Debs, 249 U.S. 211. 
38 Abrams, 250 U.S. 616. 
39 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
40 Id. (Justice Holmes did not join the majority opinion but concurred in the result.  Chief 
Justice White dissented but on the ground that the Minnesota statute ran afoul of the 
Supremacy Clause, legislating in an area left to the exclusive legislative power of Congress).   
41 Id. at 336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
42 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
43 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 336 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
44 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). See Louis Henkin, “Selective 
Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 74 (1963). 
45 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Cover, supra note 25, at 377-79. 
5
Lawrence: The Continuing Vitality
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
136 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
relied upon the “right to speak freely concerning functions of the 
Federal Government,” which he described as a “privilege and 
immunity of every citizen of the United States which, even before the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a State was powerless to 
curtail.”46   
The right of a citizen of the United States to take part, 
for his own or the country’s benefit, in the making of 
federal laws and in the conduct of the government 
necessarily includes the right to speak or write about 
them; to endeavor to make his own opinion 
concerning laws existing or contemplated prevail; and 
to this end to teach the truth as he sees it.47 
Free expression thus derived its protection, according to 
Brandeis, from the very structure of the Government created by the 
Federal Constitution.48  This “structural” approach to free expression 
proposed by Brandeis is striking in two respects.  First, it would 
provide a broad-based protection against state interference with any 
expression bearing on a national issue.49  The “structural” approach 
thus provides a more compelling and, arguably, more comprehensive 
basis for restricting state interference with expression than what 
Charles Black described as the “narrow verbal funnel of due process 
of law.”50  Second, the underpinning of the “structural” approach 
differs significantly from the marketplace of ideas notion that 
underlay the “clear and present danger” approach.51  The “structural” 
approach is driven by the need for debate in our political life.52  As 
vividly painted by Brandeis, “[l]ike the course of the heavenly 
bodies, harmony in national life is a resultant of the struggle between 
contending forces.”53 
The “structural” approach never prevailed in the Supreme 
Court, and in fact never commanded the support of any justice other 
than Brandeis himself.  It contains the seeds, however, of a theory of 
 
46 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 337 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. at 337-38. 
48 See CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35-46 
(1969). 
49 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 337-39 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
50 BLACK, supra note 48, at 46. 
51 Schenck, 249 U.S. 51-53. 
52 See id. at 338 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
53 Id. 
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free expression that might draw heavily upon the literature of 
political participation.54  Such a comprehensive theory of free 
expression might avoid some of the pitfalls of the consequentialist 
“clear and present danger” approach.  Consequentialist justifications 
for free expression necessarily limit speech based on its expected 
negative consequences and value speech based on its expected 
positive consequences.55  It was in this light that Holmes saw the 
ultimate value of free expression as flowing from a “marketplace of 
ideas” that would produce the best answer to the question being 
debated and ultimately the best results for society.56  Brandeis, in a 
more Aristotelian vein, found the core value of expression in the 
nature of a political and social community; a person’s very human 
essence is grounded in the ability to participate in that political and 
social community.57  To Brandeis, participation in public debate is 
not merely playing a role in the marketplace of ideas in order to try to 
determine the best idea.  To participate in public debate is to 
participate in civil society altogether.  Free expression to Brandeis is 
at the heart of what it means to constitute a community.58 
Brandeis’s structural approach to free expression thus finds 
the justification for the right to express oneself not in the 
consequences of that expression, or at least not solely in the likely 
consequences.  This approach provides a significant alternative to a 
consequentialist theory of expression, one that avoids the dangers 
implicit in pure consequentialism, the justification of which contains 
the seeds of its limitations.59  If speech is justified because it may 
achieve a good result, there is a corollary argument that speech may 
 
54 See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, THE CONQUEST OF POLITICS:  LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY 
IN DEMOCRATIC TIMES (1988); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY (1984); MICHAEL 
J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); see also ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (detailing an 
early exploration of the relationship between the protection of free expression and self-
government). 
55 See Tom Hentoff, Speech, Harm and Self-Government: Understanding the Ambit of the 
Clear and Present Danger Test, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1991) (discussing the “clear 
and present danger” approach). 
56 See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4 
(2004) (describing Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas). 
57 See Phillippa Strum, Brandeis: The Public Activist and Freedom of Speech, 45 
BRANDEIS L.J. 659, 704 (2007) (describing Brandeis’s view on the importance of public 
engagement). 
58 See id. at 676. 
59 See Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 688-89, 
696 (2016) (discussing the consequentialism theory). 
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be restricted because it will produce harmful results.  To be sure, no 
theory of the limits of free expression can fail to make some 
evaluation of consequences.  No satisfactory answer to any conflict 
that implicates freedom of expression can ignore the consequences of 
the expression concerned altogether.60  It is precisely because of the 
likely consequences that our intuition tells us that a meeting to 
advocate the decriminalization of narcotics should be protected 
speech whereas a meeting to organize a sale of narcotics may be 
prosecuted as a criminal conspiracy. 
Yet, consequentialism in free expression theory poses many 
dangers.61  If expression may be suppressed on the basis of its 
anticipated harm, and if the gravity of that harm will be measured by 
the legislature or perhaps the judiciary of the time, freedom of 
expression will expand and contract with the relative heat of public 
sentiment with respect to an issue, and to the public tolerance of 
views that are contrary to those held by the majority.62  Free 
expression will be restricted the most when the issues concerned are 
the most controversial, that is, just when free expression is needed the 
most.63  The American experience with restricting speech based on 
perceived consequences has not been a happy one.64  This approach 
has driven two of the most repressive periods in our recent history.65  
Courts used a consequentialist approach to justify the suppression of 
anarchist and pacifist views during and following the First World 
War under the Sedition Act of 1918, and the suppression of 
Communist views during the 1950s.66  In retrospect, we can say that 
neither threat was real but it is too easy to engage in this 
anachronistic fallacy.  In each case, the perceived threat, at the time, 
was quite real.67 
The irony is that, even as American law has become more 
protective of speech, consequentialism has remained the dominant 
approach.68  The “clear and present danger” test that the Supreme 
 
60 Id. at 688. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 733-34. 
63 Id. 
64 See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME (2004). 
65 Id. at 184, 312. 
66 Id. at 184-87, 312-15. 
67 Id. at 184-85, 312. 
68 See Goldberg, supra note 59, at 687 (discussing consequentialism as the current 
doctrine courts use). 
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Court applied to permit the prosecution of leaders of the Communist 
Party in Dennis v. United States69 was transformed in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio70 into an “imminent incitement” standard.71  Imminent 
incitement is understood largely in consequentialist terms.72  In 
Brandenburg, the Court held that the power of the state to regulate 
expression did not reach “advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation” unless the advocacy “is likely to incite or produce 
[imminent lawless] action.”73 
The path away from pure consequentialism is thus well worth 
exploring and Brandeis’s structural approach is highly promising.  I 
do not wish to overstate.  Brandeis was no stranger to 
consequentialist argument.74  It was Brandeis after all who in Whitney 
v. California75 said that when faced with “bad speech,” the “remedy 
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence,” and that the 
fundamental “freedom to think as you will, and to speak as you think 
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth.”76  However, Brandeis also saw the value of free speech as 
fundamental to the very way in which we participate in our society.  
Recall the words from his dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Minnesota.  
Brandeis wrote: 
The right of a citizen to take part, for his own or the 
country’s benefit, in the making of federal laws and in 
the conduct of the Government necessarily includes 
the right to speak or write about them; to endeavor to 
make his own opinion concerning laws existing or 
contemplated prevail; and to this end to teach the truth 
as he sees it.77 
Brandeis’s structural approach is not only different from 
consequentialist free expression jurisprudence; it also differs from 
 
69 341 U.S. 494, 508-11 (1951). 
70 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
71 Id. at 447.   
72 ANTHONY LEWIS, Keynote Address: Freedom of Speech and Incitement Against 
Democracy, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY 12 (David 
Kretzmer and Francine Kershman Hazan eds., 2000). 
73 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49. 
74 David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, And Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 334, 353 (1991). 
75 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
76 Id. at 375, 377.  
77 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 337-38 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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other deontological approaches to free expression.78  Consider the 
autonomy-based approach to free expression advocated by Ed Baker, 
among others.  Baker argued that hate speech laws are improper 
because they violate the right of an individual to say that which he 
wishes to say.79  “Law’s purposeful restrictions on [the speaker’s] 
racist or hate speech violate [that person’s] formal autonomy.”80  
Brandeis’s understanding of a right to speak, write, or teach one’s 
views, is best understood not as a freedom from but a freedom to, that 
is, not just freedom from inference with personal, even atavistic, 
autonomy, but rather freedom to engage in public life.81  Joel 
Goldstein spoke at this conference about Brandeis’s view of civic 
duty – to Brandeis there was not merely a right to vote but an 
obligation to vote; not merely a right or interest to be educated but an 
obligation to be educated so as to play a role in our democracy.82  
Brandeis biographer Alfred Lief observed in 1936,  
Brandeis had little faith in what passed for good 
government, the paternalistic hand which stunted 
growth. Ancient history was studded with instances of 
the demoralizing effects of benevolence; in Rome, 
after a period of benevolent emperors, the populace 
stagnated. America’s need was not more government 
but a greater development of her citizens.83 
For Brandeis, free expression is at the heart of each member 
of society’s project of individual development of the citizenry.84  The 
protection of this right flows not only from the specific guarantees of 
the First Amendment but from the very structure of our democratic 
system of government, a system that conveys rights but twins these 
rights with the responsibilities of an informed citizenry.  This is quite 
 
78  Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1015, 1028-29 
(2015). 
79  C. EDWIN BAKER, Autonomy and Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 
139-57 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009) (emphasis added). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Joel K. Goldstein, Brandeis on Civic Duty in a Pluralistic Society, TOURO COLLEGE 
JACOB D. FUCHSBERG LAW CENTER (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://videos.tourolaw.edu/media/+Thursday%2C+March+31%282%29+-
+Brandeis+and+the+Public+Good/0_rru1c4dz/42862991. 
83 ALFRED LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 200 (1936).  
84 See PHILIPPA STRUM, Speech and Democracy: The Legacy of Justice Brandeis Today, in 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 100: THEN AND NOW AT BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY 7 (2016). 
10
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a distance for the man who years earlier wrote that the most 
comprehensive of rights is the right to be left alone.85  This is a 
source of freedom that perhaps could allow one simply to be let 
alone, but more fundamentally, it calls on each of us to play an active 
and informed role in our governance and in our society.  
 
 
85 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating 
that “[t]he makers of our constitution … conferred, as against the government, the right to let 
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”); 
Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
11
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